The First Israel-Iran War

Where things might go from here

For the first time in over two decades the status quo in the Middle East looks like it is being upended. The Israeli airstrikes on Iran that began 48 hours ago are causing a great deal of angst, as the old world is washed away and something new slowly emerges. As such the analysis below from Jacob Shapiro is essential to understand where things may go from here.

In my opinion, Jacob is one of the world’s top geopolitical analysts. I first met him ten years ago when I started working with Dr. George Friedman at Geopolitical Futures. Jacob had just left Stratfor—the private intelligence firm George founded—where he had served as Director of the Operations Center. He was now joining George once again to help launch GPF as Director of Analysis. He has since been featured on TV and print in places like the New York Times, Fox News, CNBC and MSNBC. Today, he is Director of Research at Bespoke Group, a Colorado-based company providing solutions to high net worth families and individuals.

Jacob has kindly agreed to allow ResourceWars to reprint his fantastic analysis of this war that’s broken out between Israel and Iran. I cannot recommend his Substack Intersubjectively Transmissible enough; please go subscribe for free NOW!

So, without further ado…

THE FIRST ISRAEL-IRAN WAR

Where things might go from here…

By Jacob Shapiro

Iranian missiles fly over Tel Aviv, Israel - June 13, 2025.

I’ve been writing about Iran and Israel for almost two decades. (That’s crazy!) I’ve argued that Iran is one of the most important geopolitical actors in the world, a civilization-state with strategic depth, historical resilience, and latent power far greater than its present situation suggests. I’ve also argued that Israel, for all its triumphs, is entering a dangerous phase of overconfidence, buoyed by superior technology and a nuclear deterrent—but internally fractured in ways that have historically brought Jewish polities to ruin. What we’ve just witnessed over the last 24 hours confirms both of those views—and raises serious questions about what comes next.

Let’s state the obvious: Israel has just carried out a stunningly broad and effective series of strikes inside Iran. Reports vary, but by all accounts, Israel didn’t just hit symbolic targets. They hit air defenses in Tabriz and Hamadan. They hit underground nuclear facilities near Natanz. They hit missile sites. They assassinated key commanders. They may have taken out scientists involved in Iran’s nuclear program. They degraded Iran’s capacity to respond, at least in the short term. And they did it over multiple waves, with clarity of purpose and chilling tactical sophistication.

If you’re Iran, how do you respond to that?

There are two broad schools of thought. One says Iran is overmatched. Its air defenses were already weak, and now they’re in shambles. Its proxies—Hezbollah, the Houthis, even groups in Iraq—are either exhausted, unwilling, or under too much domestic pressure to escalate. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is fractured, and the regime is isolated both internally and diplomatically. The strikes might even be part of an intentional Israeli campaign to push Iran over the edge—forcing it to retaliate clumsily and justifying an even more devastating follow-on assault, or pushing the IRGC into accelerating nuclear weaponization under impossible conditions. That path leads to disaster.

The second school of thought is darker: Iran has no choice but to escalate. Not just to save face, but to preserve the regime. Israel has just demonstrated that it can reach anywhere, kill anyone, and destroy strategic infrastructure at will. That isn’t just a military defeat—it’s a psychological one. If the regime doesn’t respond, it looks impotent. But if it does respond and fails, it risks full-scale war. It's a classic Catch-22. And when ideologues feel cornered, they often lash out with more force than they otherwise would.

A Moment of Strategic Ambiguity

In the U.S., the political class can’t seem to decide what to say. Some officials insist the United States had no prior knowledge. Others, quoting anonymous sources, suggest the U.S. helped plan the attack by creating a false sense of calm and exploiting backchannel diplomacy in Oman. President Trump, true to form, said he knew what was up the entire time and urged Iran to come back to the negotiating table and make a deal. And meanwhile, American bases across the Persian Gulf are on high alert, worried that Tehran might not distinguish between Tel Aviv and Tampa.

Whether the U.S. was involved or not is almost beside the point. Iran will (must?) assume it was. And that assumption changes everything. If Iran believes that the U.S. and Israel are coordinating a campaign to collapse the regime—if it views these strikes not as a deterrent signal but as phase one of a decapitation effort—it has to act. That logic is what worries me most.

In that scenario, Iran may strike U.S. bases in Iraq, Bahrain, or Qatar. It may launch asymmetric attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz or encourage the Houthis to strike deeper into the Gulf. If Iran is truly close to assembling a nuclear weapon and has any capacity left to do so after the Israeli attacks, perhaps it does so and uses it as a deterrent. Maybe it transfers nuclear technology to proxies. If Iran fears for the regime’s survival, what won’t Iran do?

The Regime vs. Itself

One of the most important—and underappreciated—elements of this crisis is the internal power struggle within Iran. We often talk about “Iran” as if it’s a unified state with a single strategy, but that’s never been the case. Especially not now. What makes the current moment so dangerous is not just that Israel is attacking Iran, but that Iran is fighting with itself.

This has been building for years. The Supreme Leader is in his mid-80s and reportedly ill. His son, Mojtaba, has been quietly positioned as a possible successor—a move that would upend the very logic of the 1979 Revolution, which overthrew a hereditary monarchy and replaced it with clerical consensus. There is no consensus now. The IRGC, long the regime’s enforcer and economic powerhouse, has become a sprawling, unaccountable oligarchy. And within the IRGC itself, multiple factions are emerging—some still hardline, others willing to consider tactical reforms, especially on economic integration.

The Iranian people know this. The regime’s legitimacy is collapsing not just because of foreign pressure or a poor economy, but because its internal contradictions are too obvious to ignore. The same system that demands women cover their hair now sees its own daughters on the front lines of protest. The same elite that chants about martyrdom is busy laundering money and sending its children abroad. The Islamic Republic, for all its revolutionary rhetoric, is bleeding out through corruption, incoherence, and generational exhaustion.

And yet, it still rules. The protests that followed Mahsa Amini’s death were the most significant since 1979—but they didn’t break the regime. Why? Because the regime still holds the security services. Because the protest movement, while brave, was diffuse. And because, in moments of foreign attack, even unpopular regimes can benefit from nationalist rallying effects.

That’s the real risk here. If Israel thinks it can provoke regime change by assassinating a few key figures, it may be misreading how Iranian authoritarianism works. Conversely, if the regime believes it can deflect internal dissent by escalating with Israel or the U.S., it may be underestimating how hollow its domestic base really is.

And in the middle of all this is a terrifying possibility: that no one is actually in control. That decision-making has fragmented so thoroughly that strategic coherence is gone. That the IRGC, or a rogue commander, or even a local air defense officer, could escalate this conflict by accident or desperation. Khamenei is still alive—but the system he presides over may no longer be capable of rational action. Which means that deterrence, diplomacy, even escalation management—all the tools we use to stabilize great-power confrontation—may not apply here.

Israel’s Gamble

If this sounds like escalation, that’s because it is. And from Israel’s perspective, it is a calculated escalation. Israel has always drawn a hard red line around Iran’s nuclear program, and since October, it has increasingly viewed Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah as a direct existential threat. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech, which called on the Iranian people to rise up against their leaders, felt less like strategic signaling and more like a deliberate invitation to regime change. The precision of the strikes—targeting command centers, nuclear experts, even those involved in negotiation—suggests that this may be more than just a counter-proliferation campaign. It may be an attempt to set the clock back on Iran's geopolitical rise by 20 years or more.

But here’s the problem: Israel’s strategy may succeed militarily and still backfire historically.

Israel’s biggest advantage over its neighbors is not just technology, or U.S. support, or even its nuclear deterrent. It’s internal cohesion—a shared mission, a strong sense of national unity, one that allows Israelis to put aside differences for a common good. That is part of what the Israeli government is clearly betting on – telling Israelis to prepare for a long campaign and betting that their threshold for pain is greater than Iran’s. A week ago, far-right religious parties were threatening to bring down the government. Now major rabbinic figures are telling their followers not to go to synagogue until the IDF says it is safe to do so.

October 7^th and now this assault on Iran have papered over an increasingly disturbing reality: Israel’s unity is fraying. When it is not bombing Israel’s enemies, the Netanyahu government is deeply unpopular. Ultra-Orthodox draft exemptions are being debated in the streets. Relations with the U.S. are strained. And a growing cohort of Israeli citizens—especially younger ones—are questioning the permanent war footing that has defined their country since birth.

Meanwhile, Israel's enemies—especially Iran—are learning. They're watching. They understand that the lesson of modern warfare is not to outgun your enemy, but to outlast them. Iran doesn’t need to “win” a war against Israel. It just needs to make Israel bleed and cast doubt on the future. And what happens when Israel is no longer the only actor with drones, cyber capabilities, or AI-enhanced battlefield awareness? Israel’s technological edge is real, but it is also ephemeral.

The Long Arc of the Region

Israel has faced existential threats since its founding, and it has prevailed in ways that are genuinely awe-inspiring and geopolitics-defying. But Jewish history also teaches humility. The ancient Kingdom of Israel (aka the Davidic monarchy) was not destroyed solely by foreign conquest—it fell because of internal division and the inability to hold power together.

The danger now is not that Iran will strike back and topple Israel. The danger is that Israel will misread the moment, assume it has achieved deterrence, and then fail to prepare for the next phase—when deterrence doesn’t work, when enemies are stronger, when domestic consensus is gone, and when the U.S. may not be there to pick up the pieces.

What happens when Turkey decides it wants a drone network equal to Israel’s? What happens when Saudi Arabia, spooked by Iran's weakness and Israel’s strength, decides that its own security requires nuclear weapons? What happens when Egypt’s political sclerosis collapses and a populist regime turns hostile? We are still living in the shadow of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Arab Spring, and the Syrian Civil War. And the system is far from stable.

The belief that Israel can permanently shape the region by force, without cost, is a fantasy.

A Scary but Contained War

There’s a strange paradox to this moment. On the surface, it feels like the Middle East is on the brink of a region-wide conflagration. Israel is striking deep into Iran. Proxies are stirring. U.S. bases are on alert. Iran is whispering about nuclear red lines. And yet—this will almost certainly be a contained conflict.

Why?

Because, frankly, the Middle East no longer matters to the global system the way it once did.

This isn’t the Cold War. Iran isn’t a Chinese client state. The U.S. isn’t trying to hold a fragile anti-communist alliance together through petrodollar diplomacy. The Middle East’s centrality to global energy markets is waning—not overnight, but measurably. The U.S. is energy independent. China is building redundancies. The EU is pivoting to non-Russian sources. Oil still matters — but less than it used to, and less with every solar panel, wind farm, nuclear reactor, and geo-thermal project completed.

In other words: Israel and Iran can pound the shit out of each other, and the world will watch with alarm, but it won’t have much impact, market or otherwise.

That’s a grim observation, not a comforting one. It means that, like the Russia-Ukraine war, or India-Pakistan skirmishes, or even the slow-motion collapse of Syria, the Iran-Israel confrontation is likely to smolder within its own geography. There will be casualties. There may be proxy attacks. There might even be a dramatic escalation if someone overreaches. But no one is going to invade. No one is going to send peacekeepers. There will be outrage, diplomacy, maybe sanctions—but not intervention.

This is what multipolarity looks like.

A world where there’s no single enforcer of global norms. Where the hegemon still thinks it’s in charge—but in practice, can’t stop the chaos. Where countries act according to their own logic, not Washington’s frameworks. Where deterrence is localized, alliances are fragmented, and conflicts are managed, not resolved.

From Washington’s perspective, that’s a dangerous world. But from a geopolitical perspective, it’s just reality catching up.

And it means we need new frameworks. Because if we keep viewing every crisis through the lens of Cold War precedents or unipolar assumptions, we’re going to miss the shape of the world we’re actually living in. One where Israel and Iran might go to war—not as proxies, but as peers. And where the U.S. may still have influence, but no longer has control.

A Final Thought

Let me end where I began—with a sense of humility. We don’t yet know the full scope of Israel’s strikes, or what Iran will do in response. The news cycle will be full of updates, contradictions, retractions, and noise. (I’ve pasted below some of the more striking tidbits I’ve come across today—but even those may be overtaken by events.)

Still, moments like this force clarity. And they raise uncomfortable questions—especially for Israel.

For all its strength, Israel remains a small state, surrounded by adversaries, reliant on shifting alliances, and increasingly torn apart by internal divisions. It has a formidable military, cutting-edge technology, and an impressive history of survival against long odds. But geopolitical success isn't the same as strategic wisdom.

I said something similar back when Israel launched its offensive against Hezbollah. At the time, I thought it might be a mistake. I was wrong—at least in the short term. Israel decimated Hezbollah’s top leadership and temporarily restored deterrence. But in the long term, the jury is still out. Did Israel destroy Hezbollah—or did it sow the seeds of the next version, more radical, more decentralized, and more dangerous?

That’s the pattern. Tactical brilliance, long-term uncertainty. And that’s why Iran matters—not because of what it is today, but because of what it can become. Iran, however weakened, still has geopolitics on its side. It is a large, resource-rich, civilizational state at the heart of Eurasia, with deep historical roots and regional influence. Israel, by contrast, exists in spite of geopolitics—not because of it. Its survival depends on remaining exceptional: more united, more innovative, more disciplined than the countries around it.

Cunning, bravery, and superior technology are formidable advantages—but they are not permanent. Nor are ineptitude, internal division, or authoritarian stagnation. Israel seems certain that the Islamic Republic must be destroyed to secure its future. But what if, in dismantling this version of Iran, it inadvertently helps forge the next one—more unified, more adaptive, and fueled by a generational memory of what Israel began? Or what if, in demonstrating its reach, Israel convinces other potential rivals—from Turkey to Saudi Arabia—that they too must build the capabilities to ensure Israel can never do to them what it just did to Iran? Of course, it’s also possible that Israel is right, and will continue proving my doubts misplaced. But the line between strategic success and dangerous hubris is thinner than it appears—and history is not kind to those who forget where it lies.